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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff7Appellee,
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
vs.
94-13659 MURRAY CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT CASE NUMBER, ONE
LOT OF PROPERTY,

Case No. 960059-CA

Priority No. 15
Defendant.
FRANK PARKER,
Claimant/Appellant

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Claimant Frank Parker filed this appeal pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. This Court has appellate jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § §782a-3(2)(k) (1953 as amended), in that the Utah Supreme Court, on January 23, 1996, assigned
this case to the Court of Appeals for disposition.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a civil judgment of forfeiture entered against the defendant
currency and property, and against Claimant Frank Parker, by Judge Sandra Peuler in the Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Does the forfeiture of the Defendant property and currency violate the United States
Constitution's Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive fines or cruel and unusual
punishments?
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Does the forfeiture of the Defendant property and currency violate the United States
Constitution's prohibition against double jeopardy?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness, without deference to a trial court's ruling.
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). The trial court's determination of questions of
fact will not be set aside unless found to be clearly erroneous. Id.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 24, 1995, the State filed a complaint for forfeiture. Claimant Frank Parker filed
his answer on May 17, 1995. A trial in the forfeiture case was held on September 13, 1995. The
trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and its Judgment of Forfeiture on
October 17, 1995. Claimant filed his notice of appeal on October 5, 1995.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 21, 1994, Claimant Frank Parker (hereinafter referred to as "Claimant")
was arrested, while on parole from the Utah State Prison, after he responded to a page from John
Blanchard wherein Mr. Blanchard informed Claimant that he (Blanchard) wished to purchase
cocaine from Claimant. (F. 2, R. 39) Claimant was arrested at a 7-11 convenience store located
at 4811 South State Street, where he had arrived in the Defendant vehicle, to consumate a
cocaine sale to Mr. Blanchard. (F. 3, R. 39).
After securing Claimant and his vehicle, a search of the Defendant vehicle was
conducted, incident to Claimant's arrest, and pursuant to the terms and conditions of Claimant's
parole release from the Utah State Prison. At the time of Claimant's arrest, only he and his
passenger had been in the Defendant vehicle. (F. 4, R. 39) In the Defendant vehicle, a black
pouch was found, which contained several small baggies, each of which contained a white,
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powdery substance. (F. 5, R. 39) This type of packaging is consistent with the sale and
distribution of cocaine. (F. 5, R. 39).
Claimant's passenger, Kimberlee Croft testified that the black pouch and baggies were
the sole property and possessions of Claimant. (F. 6, R. 40) At the time of Claimant's arrest, he
was transporting, in his vehicle, several baggies which contained a white, powdery substance.
The substance was tested by the Utah State Crime Lab, and found to be cocaine, with a total
weight of 10.7 grams. (F. 7, R. 40).
At the time of Claimant's arrest, he was using and had used the Defendant vehicle, pager
and cellular telephone to facilitate the transportation and distribution of controlled substances, to
wit: cocaine. (F. 8, R. 40) At the time of Claimant's arrest, he was in the possession of the
defendant currency, which was located in the proximity of controlled substances, to wit: cocaine,
and which is therefore presumed to be the illegal proceeds of the distribution , purchase or sale of
controlled substances. (F. 9, R. 40).
Defendant currency was found in proximity to controlled substances, namely cocaine.
Claimant produced no evidence sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption that the
defendant currency is the proceeds of, or was intended to be used to facilitate, violations of the
Utah Controlled Substances Act. (F. 10, R. 40) Claimant produced no testimony or witnesses to
contradict the State's witness evidence and testimony. (F. 11, R. 40) Defendant currency is the
proceeds of the illegal trafficking or distribution of controlled substances. (F. 12, R. 40) Frank
Parker is and was at all times the only registered owner and title holder in and to said Defendant
vehicle. (F. 14, R. 40).
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On April 24, 1995, a Complaint of Forfeiture1 was filed by the Salt Lake County
Attorney's office, seeking forfeiture of the Defendant property and currency seized from
Claimant on November 21, 1994. Notice of Seizure, Intent to Forfeit and a copy of the
complaint were served upon Claimant on April 28, 1995 (See Return of Service, R. 10). On May
17, 1995, Claimant filed an Answer to the Forfeiture Complaint.
On January 12, 1995, Claimant entered a plea of guilty to the reduced offense of
Possession of a Controled Substance3. The trial in the forfeiture case was held on September 13,
1995. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment of Forfeiture4 were thereafter
entered by the Court on October 17, 1995. (R. 38-43, 46-49)
CONSTTTUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Eighth Amendment to the United States Consitution:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment of indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when
in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 of Appellee's Addendum.
Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 of Appellee's Addendum.
See Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) attached as Addendum G of Appellant's Brief.
Attached as Exhibits 3 and 4, respectively, of Appellee's Addendum.
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Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1) (Supp. 1995):
The following are subject to forfeiture and no property right exists
in them: . . .
(b)
all raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind
used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing,
delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled substance in violation of
this chapter.
(e)
all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used
or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the
transportation, sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property
described in Subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b),...
(g)
everything of value furnished or intended to be furnished in
exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this act, and all
moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used
to facilitate any violation of this act;
SUMMARY QF THE ARGUMENT
Claimant failed to raise both his Eighth Amendment, Excessive Fines, challenge to the
subject forfeiture proceedings, and his Fifth Amendment, Double Jeopardy challenge to the
subject forfeiture proceedings in any way sufficient to allow either the State to respond thereto at
the trial court, or to allow the trial court to commence any analysis of these issues. Claimant
offered no evidence or testimony regarding the issues he now raises on appeal, and only briefly
alluded to the issues in his arguments to the trial court and the close of the forfeiture trial.
Claimant failed to preserve the issues he now briefs on appeal, and should be precluded from
asserting these issues in this forum.
The forfeiture of the defendant property is not excessive under the Eighth Amendment.
There is undisputed evidence that the forfeited property is the instrumentality and proceeds of
illegal drug trafficking. A clear nexus exists between the property and the criminal conduct of
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Claimant. Further, the forfeiture here at issue is certainly not so disproportionate as to be
determined excessive for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.
Finally, the United States Supreme Court, last month, ruled that civil in rem forfeitures
are not punishments for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the federal Constitution.
Consequently, there is no Fifth Amendment prohibition against the instant forfeiture.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT FAILED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUES HE NOW RAISES ON APPEAL
Appellate courts do not generally consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. See
State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993). This general rule applies to all issues,
including constitutional issues. Id- The purpose of requiring issues to be raised and preserved in
the trial court is to "put the judge on notice of the asserted error and allow the opportunity for
correction at that time in the course of the proceeding." Broberg v. Hess. 782 P.2d 198, 201
(Utah App. 1989). This Court has long advised that "the trial court is considered the proper
forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis of issues". Brown, supra, at 360,
quoting State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990)(requiring defendants to introduce
their request for state constitutional interpretation before the trial court). Failing to do so denies
the trial court "the opportunity to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law pertinent to the
claimed error". Brown, supra, at 360, quoting LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enter.. 823 P.2d 479,
483 n.6 (Utah App. 1991).
A.

Specificity

In order to properly raise an issue in the trial court and preserve it for appeal, a
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of claims of error must be
6

made in the trial court. State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987). Such an objection and
preservation must be specific and timely, Brown, supra at 360, and must be a part of the trial
court record. State v. Pilling. 875 P.2d 604, 606 (Utah App. 1994).
The specificity requirement arises as an inherent component of the trial court's need to
assess the specific legal doctrine placed at issue in the context of the facts as they are borne out
through trial. See Brown, supra at 361. Merely mentioning an issue without introducing
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority does not preserve that issue for appeal. Brown.
supra at 361; LeBaron, supra at 483 (emphasis added).
In this case, Appellant failed to raise perceived constitutional issues in his Answer. He
further failed to raise or argue such issues in his pre-trial "Motion to Return Seized Evidence".
At trial, he failed to present any evidence or case in chief whatsoever, and, according to his
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Affirmance he merely "recollects addressing the issue
of 'Double Jeopardy,' and 'Excessive Fining Imposement". The record reveals no submissions
of relevant legal authority seeking the trial court's interpretation of the double jeopardy or
excessive fines clauses of the Constitution, and in fact, there were none.
Following trial, at which Appellant failed to introduce any evidence or testimony,
Appellant, in his closing argument, with no prior motions, memoranda or citations, mentioned
the issues of double jeopardy and excessive fines. Appellant failed to appropriately seek the trial
court's interpretation of the issues he now raises on appeal. Appellant failed to preserve his
claimed constitutional prohibitions in the trial court, and he should not now be able to raise them
in this forum. At no time were Appellant's constitutional claims raised in the trial court
sufficiently to be considered and addressed by the trial court and thereby preserved for this
Court.
7

B.

Timing

Because Appellant's pre-trial and trial litigation lacked substantive specificity to
adequately preserve the issues he now raises in his appeal, it is appropriate for this Court to
consider whether any later actions by Appellant sufficiently and timely raised or preserved his
appellate claims. See Brown, supra at 361. Timeliness is considered a prerequisite to appellate
review because entertaining belatedly raised issues "sanctions the practice of withholding
positions that should properly be presented to the trial court but which may be withheld for the
purpose of seeking a reversal on appeal." Brown, supra at 361-62, quoting State v. Lee. 633 P.2d
48, 53 (Utah 1981); State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 78 (Utah App. 1990).
Appellant has failed to undertake any post-trial motions, and has made no effort to
belatedly, or in any manner, allow the trial court to address his constitutional claims. In fact,
Appellant failed to even wait until the trial court had entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and its Judgment of Forfeiture, before filing his Notice of Appeal. This was
in spite of the fact that the Davis case which he cites as authority for his position in his
Docketing Statement was decided on September 21, 1995, a full two weeks before he filed his
Notice of Appeal. There were no post-trial efforts to raise Appellant's claimed errors in the trial
court. This paucity of preservation waives, and should conclusively preclude this Court's
consideration of Appellant's unpreserved issues, and therefore of his appeal in whole. See
Brown, supra, at 363.
C.

Appellant May Not Excuse Failure To Preserve Appellate Issues
By Relying On The Plain Error Exception.

In State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that issues
raised for the first time on appeal would be addressed only if the trial court proceedings
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demonstrated plain error. The Court held that the plain error exception to the preservation
requirement has two prerequisites, each of which must be met for appellate review of issues
raised for the first time on appeal. First, the purported error must have been obvious to the trial
court. Second, the error must have been harmful in that it affects the substantial rights of a party.
See Id., at 853.
Appellant's double jeopardy and excessive fines arguments would not have been obvious
to the trial court, absent an appropriate raising and preservation of the issues. At the time of trial,
no Utah appellate court had interpreted the double jeopardy clause in the context of property
forfeitures arising pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 et seg. And in fact, at this time, this
Court's decision in State v. Davis. 903 P.2d 940 (Utah App. 1995) cert granted — P.2d — (SC
96-0005)(03-26-96), remains the only appellate decision regarding the double jeopardy
implications of property forfeitures incident to the enforcement of Utah's controlled substances
laws. Davis arose in the context of a forfeiture in connection with possession of a controlled
substance and deals only with conveyance forfeitures arising under Utah Code Ann. § 58-3713(l)(e). Id. at 949 n.13. Furthermore, because Appellant failed to adequately raise an excessive
fines claim, the State put on no evidence, and the Court made no findings, as to the value of the
items forfeited or the cost of prosecuting Appellant. It is clear that Appellant's issues on appeal
were not, and could not have been, obvious to the trial court.
In comparison, the Supreme Court, in State v. Eldredge, faced a similar situation where
an appellant failed to raise an issure in the trial court, and raised it for the first time on appeal,
citing as support for reversal, a decision which was rendered after the trial. See State v. Eldredge.
773 P.2d 29 (Utah) cert denied 493 U.S. 814, 110 S.Ct. 62, 107 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989). Eldredge
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arose from a child abuse prosecution, and dealt with whether or not the trial court's failure to
enter written findings under section 76-5-411 was plain error. Id. at 34-36. The Eldredge court
concluded that no plain error had occurred, and in so doing, its "primary reason was the fact that
the trial court had not yet had the benefit of the supreme court's opinion in State v. Nelson, 725
P.2d 1353 (Utah 1986)". State v. Cook. 881 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah App. 1994).
Similarly, in the instant case, Appellant claims that the trial court's forfeiture of the in
rem defendant property is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause of the United States
Constitution, as interpreted by this Court in Davis. However, the Davis decision was issued
eight days after trial in this matter. The trial court did not have the benefit of Davis at the time of
trial, nor could the State alert the court of Davis's impact on the case then at bar. Following this
court's decision in Davis, Appellant failed to properly raise any claimed Davis issues with the
trial court in post trial relief motions.
Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that drug
related forfeitures do not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes. See United States
v. Tilley. 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994). Where there is a difference of Constitutional
interpretation between two federal circuits (at the time of trial, the Ninth Circuit had held that
forfeitures are punishment for double jeopardy purposes, United States v. $ 405.089.23 U.S.
Currency. 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), opinion amended on denial of rehearing 56 F.3d 41 (9th
Cir. 1995), rev'd— S.Ct.—, slip. op. (U.S. June 24, 1996), the State submits that the trial court
commited no plain error in forfeiting the seized property, absent, and especially in light of,
Appellant's failure to preserve his issues on appeal.
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The State does not address the substantial right prong of the plain error exception, in that
although the State would agree that property ownership and double jeopardy are substantial
rights, the substantial right infringement is conjunctive with the finding of an obvious error, and
the failure of the alleged error to be obvious to the trial court prevents this Court from reaching
consideration of whether or not Appellant suffered the infringment of a substantial right.
D,

Appellant May Not Excuse Failure To Preserve Appellate Issues
By Relying On The Exceptional Circumstances Exception.

Although it is not well defined, an additional exception to the preservation requirement
has arisen, in the context of exceptional circumstances. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n.3
(Utah 1993). The exception is ill-defined, and applies primarily to rare procedural anomalies. Id.
The instant case does not present a rare procedural anomaly for several reasons. First,
Appellant is basing his appeal on federal double jeopardy jurisprudence, as well as the Davis
decision. Although Davis was rendered after trial in this matter, Appellant failed to use post-trial
relief motions to seek the trial court's determination Davis'' effect on the facts and evidence of
this case. This cannot be the first, nor will it likely be the last time that an appellate decision has
possible bearing on a recently tried case. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate such
circumstances, and consequently allow post-trial relief motions. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59, and 60.
The timing of the Davis decision does not create a rare procedural anomaly in this case. Cf. State
v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987)(where the court found exceptional circumstances
because if the court did not decide the issue, there could conceivably be two separate judgments
and two appeals from the same case).
Second, although Appellant relies on federal double jeopardy jurisprudence in this
appeal, citing $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, which was decided by the 9th Circuit in 1994, in
support of his assignment of error, he supplied no such case law for the court's pre-trial or posttrial review. Appellant clearly could have submitted this case to the trial court in order to raise
and preserve the issue, and did not. The fact that this Court relied on $405.089.23 U.S. Currency
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in its Davis decision merely supports the State's contention that case law existed which would
have supported Appellant's position if he had desired to seek the trial court's review of his
current constitutional claims.
Third, at the time of trial, as has been previously pointed out, Utah case law was silent as
to whether or not forfeitures are punishment for purposes of Constitutional double jeopardy
protections. There are a myriad of other issues which have yet to be decided by Utah appellate
courts. This Court should not condone or sanction Appellant's failure to preserve his issues
merely because Utah case law was silent at the time of trial. Such an exception would make a
mockery of the preservation requirement, and would certainly not be indicative of an exception
for rare procedural anomalies. Appellant's failure to appropriately and adequately preserve his
appellate issues prevented the trial court from undertaking a "thoughtful and probing analysis of
the issues". State v. Bobo. supra, at 1273, which is the very reason Utah courts refuse to address
issues on appeal which were not raised in the trial court. See Brown, supra, 856 P.2d at 359-60.
POINT II
THE FORFEITURE OF THE DEFENDANT PROPERTY
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Claimant asserts that the forfeiture here at issue violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution^ The United States Supreme Court, in
Austin v. United States. 113 S.Ct. 2801 (1993), ruled that a federal forfeiture statute6 is subject
to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines. This application of the Eighth
Amendment was echoed by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. A House and 1.37 Acres. 886
P.2d 534 (Utah 1994), wherein the Court held that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fine's
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. Claimant has neither raised nor briefed any issues relating to the Utah Constitution. Consequently the State will
not address such State Constitutional claims.
6

. 21U.S.C.A. §881(a)(4,7)
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Clause applies to I Jtah Code Ann. §58-37-1 3( 1 i of the I Jtah Controlled Substances Act, which

proceeds of drug crimes, involved in illegal drug activities.
The purpose of the Eighth Amendment is to limit the government's power to pui
Austin

: "^S* "

'

'

.•

•

:...-'•*

- nu

punishment purpose, then UK ijrhvui-jiMv ^i the highth Amendment is no\ Uiggux*

Court, in A House and / 3" Acres, supra, held that, as applied to real estate and conveyances.
1

^ci,. *.

_..,h

Amendment protections iii upph mg UIL Fighdi Amendment's protections against excessive
lines, the Utah Court held thai the relevant uiqmr\ to detennun uhethe? *•• ->»>t a for!eitujv K

an analysis oi the proportionally bet\w

^ hn leituiv and the c nniinui actn ities. A House and

1.37 Acres, supra at M :
1 \ee^ 3 >)M -

-

.

and the use to which it is put, and secondarily by the proportionality between the criminal
offense and the property forfeited.
A.

Nexus and Instrumentality

"Any excessive fines analysis should begin with a basic "substantial connection" or
t

\ >, I V U M en ivi

i . •

.

vcn.\

Under an instrumentality analysis, "the focus is on the relationship between the property
and the offense, i.e., was it close enough to render the property, under traditional standards,
'guilty'and henceforth forfeitable?" A House and , - \ v u •
v. One Parcel of Property Located at 427 & 42c> Hall Street. •
Ala..

•

••

-

;„nitcj States

inerv. Montgomery County.

. n# JVUSU... supra at 181.'» (Si aha, J. „

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). The initial burden is on the state to
establish a "substantial connection" between the defendant property and the offense. A House
and 1.37 Acres, supra at 541.
In this case, the trial court found, based upon evidence, that the defendant pager was used
to summon claimant to a controlled substance exchange, that the pager and cellular telephone
were used to facilitate the distribution of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, that the
seized currency was located in the proximity of controlled substances, and that the seized
currency was the proceeds of illegal drug distribution.
Further, the trial court found that the forfeited vehicle was used to transport and conceal
10.7 grams of cocaine which was packaged for distribution, (F, 7,8; R.40), and was used to
facilitate the illegal distribution of cocaine. (F8, R.40).
The clear evidence provides ample nexus between the forfeited property and the
distribution of cocaine. Clearly the forfeited property was, each and all, the instrumentalities
used by Claimant to illegally distribute, attempt to distribute or agree and arrange to distribute
cocaine. Defendant has failed to marshall any evidence against the trial court's Findings of Fact,
and, in fact, failed to present any evidence at all to the trial court. (F.l 1, R.40).
B.

Proportionality

Neither the Utah Supreme Court in A House and 1.37 Acresr, nor the United States
Supreme Court in Austin set forth a detailed test as to when a forfeiture is prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment because of excessiveness. It is apparent, however, that something more than
merely the status of the property as an instrumentality of crime is to be considered.
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iiicv..;i v. One 1982 Silver Honda Motorcycle. *•

!>

"'

' ." ^

j: »i > 198 7), th< = ! Jl i ih

Court of Appeals had an opportunity to consider whether u cw ?i forfeiture was "unduly harsh."
Tin CIIIIII lii'lul lli.il illlin,1 loilcilmiii n\\ i mlniiuli' \aliial all UJ I(HM) compared to the $60.00
street value of amphetamine tablets was not considered "unduly harsh." Id. at 395.
The Utah Supreme Court has also noted that "as for the small amount of drugs involved,
i i i i l i u i i i l 1 l i r h l lli.tl

H U M ii i h li;ii<«

l

'

l

'

•

l

quantity of contraband found," State v. One
Other jill isdicti- 3ns hi.. -

•

' '

"

:..u

'

' '

"

'

i l l 11 n

: \ ; <X. ! 41-42 (Utah 1986).

q,, .._« ~ :i:xiai .SLU..;^ w:\c\i determining whether

a forfeiture is disproportionate to the offense committed. See United. States \ Culler. 979 F.2d
092 (4th Cr

1 no

t'liiumi i***i..-.

2) (forfeiture of a $300,000.00 building used to distribute controlled substances

•• * •*

.

United States v. One 1 *

»| Hi- n\\ lii'liiiiiij'lY ilispii piiihoi ili lii lii*. 'ipftiiisi );

,che. 670 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1979) ("forfeiting a $35,000.00

automobile which is used to transport 6.23 grains of cocaine and 2.78 grams of concentrated
cannabis is not 'grossly disproportionate to the offense committed.1"; United States v.
Cunningham. 757 F.Supp. 840 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (forfeiture of $432,850.00 for purchasing thirty
( U l i kilnj.inini' nl (*K nut » "i1

i ""

iii M hi«lmiii|.p| \ tlisjin i|»ai in iiijiir \w 11 HI1 damage lie has

caused;1'); United States v. U. S. Fishii

im, 725 F.Supp. 1222 (S.D.Fla. 1989)

(forfeiture ol defendant":) liieboat valued at 30:

was not disproportionate to $1,942.40 of

illegally obtained seafood.).
In this case, the forfeited property consists of a 1986 Honda vehicle, a pager, a cellular
telephone JIKI "i Ih 7 (ill ml dmc pronvrt,';

z'1 f tn.iil inn i vidnin" \uii' iiiiiitiin i j u t u l a lo lli

ilii

the vehicle, or the value of the drugs seized, as Claimant foiled to raise an Eighth Amendment
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argument in any of his pleadings, and did not present any evidence of his own. When Claimant
first raised the Eighth Amendment issue, in his closing argument at trial, the trial court allowed
the State to discuss relative values, with the approximate value of the seized drugs being
$ 2,000.00. (Tr. 6, R. 81). The relative values herein involved clearly fall within the nonexcessive parameters set by this Court, and other jurisdictions, in previous cases. Claimant
presented no evidence as to the value of the vehicle forfeited, and in fact, rose no Eighth
Amendment argument unti lit was too late for the State to re-open the trial and introduce such
evidence.

POINT III
THE FORFEITURE OF THE DEFENDANT PROPERTY
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
A,

In Rem Forfeiture Is a Remedial Sanction Which Does Not
Implicate The Double Jeopardy Clause.

Claimant contends that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution prohibits the State from seeking the forfeiture of the Defendant
property following his collateral criminal conviction.
The Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause provides: "nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb" U.S. Const. Amend. V.
The core area protected by this clause has always been a defendant's right not to be tried for a
criminal charge more than once. United States v. Wilson. 420 U.S. 332, 343, (1975); See Schiro
v. Farley. 114 S.Ct. 783, 789 (1994) (holding that the prohibition against multiple trials is the
controlling constitutional principle). See also Tibbs v. Florida 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982); United
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States v. Dixon. I i \ "' "' 'I }M l(> '}KK » I I WVi |S,»,iU i '

in

TI I,I. II,

ll„

,IM^IIH

nl in ,,;i,l un.l

dissenting in part). State v. Miller. 747 !\2d 440 (I Jtali App. ! ->- . ) .
Ci i' II forfeiture statutes, however, have never been viewed as having a pervasive, penal
effect. The Supreme Court has often rejected the claim that statutes providing for the in rem ci < il
forfeiture of property constitute punishment for Double Jeopardy purposes, Indeed, because laws

of customs and imposts laws M piracy - were anions' the earliest statutes enacted by Congress
See United States v. K)i liuena \ ista Av>

1

^

11

^

11

^2 (\ 993) (plurality opinion

of Stevens, J.), they ^ r itediy have been upheld amr-M '(

<v\ mv CSSHIILIIII *

criminal and subject to the prodedural rules governing criminal prosecutions." Helvering v.
Mitchell. 303 1 J S 3C 1 I I : [U 38]
In Various Items of Personal Property v. United States. 282 U.S. 577 (1931), the Supreme
Court unanimously rejected the contention that the prior conviction of property owners for
defrauding the government of liqi lor taxes bai red the forfeiti ire of propei t) (
warehouse, and a denaturing plant) used in the commission of the fraud. Id. at 580. The court:
reason

ig against the property, rattier than "a

criminal prosecution

*.

i^ the wrongdoer in person who is proceeded against,

convicted aiiu paii^h^

ki. .n ;>N * J he court accordingly concluded that "[t]he forfeiture is no

part of the punishment for the criminal offense," and th<: it "[t]he j: t o v ision of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution in respect of double jeopardy does not apply." Ibid.: See also
Dobbins's Distillen v United States. 96 1 J.S 395, < 103 10 1 (18 ; 8). 7
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In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States. 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam), the
Supreme Court rejected the notion that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a forfeiture of
property smuggled into the United States after the acquittal of the person charged with illegally
importing the property. The Court held that "the forfeiture is not barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it invovles neither two criminal trials nor two criminal
punishments." Id. at 235. The court found that the civil sanction of forfeiture was properly
characterized as remedial because "[i]t prevents forbidden merchandise from circulating in the
United States, and, by its monetary penalty, it provides a reasonable form of liquidated damages
for violation of the inspection provisions and serves to reimburse the Government for
investigation and enforcement expenses." Id at 236-237; See also Van Oster v. Kansas. 272
U.S. 465, 466 (1926) (property used to violate the law may be regarded as a "common
nuisance").
The Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed its long standing view of in rem forfeitures
in United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms. 465 U.S. 354 (1984), where the Court held
that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar a civil in rem action to forfeit firearms "involved in
or used or intended to be used in" violations of the Gun Control Act of 1968 following the
owner's acquittal of related violations of that Act. Id. at 362-366. The court explained that,
"[u]nless the forfeiture sanction was intended as punishment, so that the proceeding is essentially
criminal in character, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not applicable." Id. at 362. In concluding

Various Items was decided on the same day as United States v. La Franca 282 U.S. 568 (1931), where the court,
to avoid a constitutional issue, unanimously construed a statute that authorized a civil action to recover certain taxes,
which the court viewed as penalties, as not permitting such recovery after conviction of the defendant for a criminal
offense arising from the same transactions. Justice Sutherland, who wrote for the Court in both cases, after alluding
to La Franca, noted that such considerations did not apply to "a proceeding in rem to forfeit property used in
committing an offense." Various Items, supra at 580.
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IM' " i r v c d .T- II Si i u l m l i i Mlii Idl [ >l uSCI i i l h h t i , lliC C O U l t

noted that Congress intended the forfeiture to be a civil remedy, Id at 363, that the forfeiture
provisions were meant to ... oroader in scope than the criminal sanctions," L4 at 364, since they
provided for forfeiture of proeprty "involved in or used or ini *

f

law, Id. at 363, and that the statute furthered the "broad remedial aims" of "discouraging

used or intended for use outside regulated channels of commerce," Id. at 364/ Because the
forfeiture served goals "plainly more remedy uian punitive" Ibid., and because the clair'int
failed to clearly establish that the statute was "so p=m i t i \ t • i * i •'

!

Congress' intent "to establish a civil remedial mechanism" Id. at 365, the court concluded that
the

i\ criminal act, but r*ihf*r Q

'

separate civil sanction, remedial in nature[,] .. . [that was] not barred by the Double Jeop
Clause, Id. ui ,>o(#.
The cases relied on bv (liiimanl misumsliin,' u iliiin If (I IN1 Niiriiniiic ( 'in mil s, ilk IT; inn is
since 89 Firearms, contorting them into a hybrid of Eighth Amendment/ Fifth Amendment
JUM' piii'lfu * " 1111 li I'l'iiniK (i in i mi, luiittlied j cars ol Supreme ( .... ^neiture precedents, by
failing to recognize that United States v. Halper. 490 U.S. 4 J 3 , IU9 S.CI. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 48 7
(. * •*": ; n\ okcd an established doctrine of double jeopardy law — the prohibition of multiple
punishments— which by then had developed subitrI (< > i111pu11;1111 In11i h 11 n iI• • S p< v i I i r; 11 h th.it
branch of double jeopardy law only comes into operation when a criminal defendant has been

Compare Utah Code. Ann. § 58-37-13(1) et seg., which likewise extends forfeitures to properties and items
derived from, used, or intended to be used, to facilitate a violation, oft IK- \ -lah •' '-;-:MiL'd Substances Act.
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placed "in jeopardy, i.e. at risk of conviction for a criminal offense. The protection against
multiple punishments is a consequence of jeopardy, not a substitute for it.
B.

In Rem Forfeitures Do Not Implicate The Double Jeopardy
Clauses' Prohibition Against Multiple Punishments

The Supreme Court has interpreted the "multiple punishments" doctrine as reflecting two
distinct principles of double jeopardy law. The first principle is that the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits a court, when it sentences a defendant in a criminal case, from imposing greater
punishment than the legislature intended. North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 U.S. 711, 717-718
(1969). The second principle is that the Clause also protects "against additions to a sentence in a
subsequent proceeding that upset a defendant's legitimate expectation of finality." Jones v.
Thomas. 491 U.S. 376, 385 (1989). An improper increase to a sentence would occur, for
example, "where a judge imposes only a 15-year sentence under a statute that permitted 15 years
to life, has second thoughts after the defendant serves the sentence, and calls him back to impose
another 10 years." Ibid.. See Id. at 392-394. (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. United States v.
DiFrancesco. 449 U.S. 117, 139 (1980); Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer. 474 U.S. 28, 30-31
(1985) (per curiam).
Halper was an extension of the rule that a judgment of conviction in a criminal case, once
it has become final and unappealable, may not be modified so as to increase the sentence already
imposed. Halper was criminally prosecuted and convicted in 1985 of violating the federal falseclaims statute,9 by submitting 65 inflated Medicare claims that each charged $12 for what was
really a $3 procedure. He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment and fined $5,000. Halper.
supra at 437 & n.2.
The government later sought civil sanctions based on the same inflated claims under a
"fixed-penalty-plus-double-damages provision" of the type that "in the ordinary case . . . can be
said to do no more than make the Government whole." Id. at 438, 449. That statute required for
each violation a penalty of $2,000, an additional amount equal to two times the government's
9

18 U.S.C. §287(1982)
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damages, and the costs of the civil action jd. at 438. Because of his numerous violations,
however, "Halner . . . appearei ' '

I.

In upholding inc UibU.v i u)iin ,s iciu.^ai u< aiter judgment m that amount, me supreme
Court noted, "the Double Jeopard) Clause's proscription of multiple punishment
mtrnv*.

.

^

i

and the purposes thai the pen,: i\ ma) linm he sjid to serve," Id. at 448. 1 he Court concluded
that "the labels 'criminal and 'civil' are not of paramount importance" in that inquiry, since "in
dHHitiitiiii^ whether ,' (> i l h i u'.n

rivl

\

SIMK'IMMI

\ 'M'SIIIM'I *. a I'nm'ni'l pimi'.limen

•

'"i

purposes actually served by the sanction in question, not the underlying nature of the proceeding
giving rise to the sanction, that must be evaluated." M. ai 44 7 &, u.,. I he court accordingly
h[e]ld that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who
alreadv has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be
subjc
.o an additional civil sanction to the extent that the
second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial but
only as a deterrent or retribution.
M, ai 4>fl"i 44 i1 (cmpliaM1. aildnl), ih t ont A House and 1.37 Acres, supra.

^ iU<iperc™%T*

emphasized it was defining "a rule for the rare case," when a defendant ib bur v? -"
so "overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has caused" that "it constitutes a second
punishment.

i.

Austin leaves unaltered the conclusion that an initial "jeopardy" is a prerequisite to the
ii

-

/loieuion.-*. lustin, which was not a double jeopardy case, held

that the civil forfeiture provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(4), (7) there at issue -rigioci
applicability of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. The Austin court expressly
distingui ! .

•

•.

. ... >r

goods involved in customs violations, after noting that the forfeitures in both of those cases were
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remedial. Austin, supra at 2811 -2812 {citing 89 Firearms, supra and One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones, supra.). The Austin court relied on Halper in assessing whether in rem civil forfeitures
could be viewed as a "punishment" that triggers the protections of the Eighth Amendment.
Austin, supra at 2805-2806, 2810 n.12, 2812. But Austin did not purport to alter Halper's double
jeopardy holding as a rule for "the rare case" in which "a prolific but small-gauge offender [was
subjected] to a [civil] sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has caused,"
after having been criminally prosecuted and punished. Halper. supra at 449.
Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch. 114 S.Ct. 1937 (1994), the third in a
recent trio of cases on which the Ninth Circuit relied, and upon which Claimant relies in
asserting that in rem forfeitures implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause, does not support
Claimant's interpretation of Halper and Austin. Kurth Ranch mentioned Austin only in passing
to describe Austin's Eighth Amendment holding, Kurth Ranch, supra at 1945, and actually held
that Halper did not furnish the proper framework for analyzing the issue before the court, which
was whether the Double Jeopardy Clause barred collection of Montana's drug stamp tax on the
possession of dangerous drugs after the "taxpayers" had been criminally prosecuted and
punished. Kurth Ranch supra at 1948. The court struck down the tax's imposition after a
criminal conviction, based on several "unusual features" in the statute that authorized it, which
"[t]aken as a whole" rendered the tax "a concoction of anomalies." Id. at 1947, 1948.
Specifically, the court found it significant that the tax statute conditioned liability on commission
of a crime, that the tax was due and collectable "only after the taxpayer ha[d] been arrested for
the precise conduct that gives rise to the tax obligation in the first place," that the tax was an in
personam sanction that was exacted after the drugs had been confiscated and destroyed, and that
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Iln« U\\ mi n ni miml i "ill In iniHur III in rii'lil linn". line iiii.irbl \ \\\\\v ml llir ilniy . lull -ml III"111 I ' ('i lln
court noted, "[a] tax on 'possession' of goods that no longer exist and that the taxpayer never
la w liillll;) possessed as an unmi

.L^J.'!^

\ active character" especially when it is "imposed on

criminals and no others." Id. at 1948.
Those exceptional features persuaded the court that the proceeding to collect the tax "was
1

,

u

n

jeopardy a second time lo? \h same offense'" for which they had previously been criminally
prosecute

....„.*• conclusion that the Halper test was inapplicable suggests that

the court viewed the proceeding to collect the tax as Y ^ c r ^

'• • hci\cnn^.. w*; ••.

at 400, and thus that it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition on successive criniin il
prosecutions
Claimant relies upon Davis, to support his proposition that Utah double jeopardy
jurisprudence regards all in rem forfeitures as punishment. In Davis, the Court of Appeals h
that the forfeiture of a vehicle, pi u si lant
the illegal possession ol 1/4 gram of cocaine \ahu * * ipproximalely $25, constituted
p .i -;.i

•«

le jeopardy clause. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of

Appeals relied upon its analysis of the reasoning set out in Austin and adopted in A House and
LJ

,icres, basing its analysis on the Ninth Circuit's decision in $405,023.89 U. S, Currency,

supra.
Based on that analysis, ihe Davis court ruled thai the appropriate test is to determine
s\

. .

,..ess the sanction can be viewed as

solely remedial, the court ruled, it should be considered punishment, Da\ K
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which is the exact opposite application of the remedial standard set forth in Various Items, and its
progeny.
Last month, it its most recent and most definitive Double Jeopardy/Forfeiture ruling, the
United States Supreme Court stated clearly and concisely, that "These civil forfeitures (and civil
forfeitures generally),... do not constitute "punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. United States v. Ursery. — S.Ct. -—, slip op. at 1, (U.S. 06-24-96) [consolidated appeals
and decisions of United States v. Ursery. on certiorari to the Sixth Circuit, and United States v.
$405.023.89. on certioarai to the Ninth Circuit.]
Speaking first of the analysis used by the Ninth Circuit, and relied upon in Davis, the
Court stated:
We think that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit misread Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch. None of those decisions
purported to overrule the well-established teaching of Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones
and 89 Firearms.
IdL, at 14.

Emphasizing that Halper involved a civil penalty, and not a civil forfeiture, the Court
again stated that the rule enunciated in Halper is limited to civil penalty cases, and not civil
forfeitures. Id
Civil forfeitures, in contrast to civil penalties, are designed to do more than simply
compensate the Government. Forfeitures serve a variety of purposes, but are designed
primarily to confiscate property used in violation of the law, and to require disgorgement
of the fruits of illegal conduct.... Quite simply, the case-by-case balancing test set forth
in Halper, in which a court must compare the harm suffered by the Government against
the size of the penalty imposed, is inapplicable to civil forfeiture.
LLAtl6.
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disclaimed reliance upon Halper, finding that its case-specific approach was impossible to apply
Dutside the context of a fixed ci \ il p enalt> pro\ ision. ,Icl
The Court further ruled, and clarified, that the Austin holding was limited to the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, declining to expand Austin \s analysis into
doi lble jeopard} ji irispi i idence M at 19.
In sum. the Court ruled, "nolhini: in Hainc Kurth Ranch, or Austin, purported to replace
<

.jr....a.;j;;^ .:iucvi\., ^ii.-.i.,. w».-es not constitute punishment for the purpose

of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id Consequently, the Double Jeopardy bar against multiple
punishments is inapplicable.
1
Circuit's decision in $405,023 Hl) compel the rcsersal and dismissal of the instant civil in rem
forfeiture action. T;K ;.„p^;,.. Court has reversed the Ninth Circuit, and made clear that the
Ninth Circuit's analysis of Austin, Halper and Kurth Ranch v\ -• \ • v i is

!
; ""

ssi i m

*;

;

---

rose and preserved the Double Jeopardy issue for appeal, which the State vigorously disputes, the
S'uprenu "' oii«' • » ill

' i ' n "n Ill ii" ' ' / ' i ' " «*(Mii(ids I!H I "in h'sion \\x\xil\ms, as it interprets

federal constitutional claims, is no longer viable, and that civil in rem forfeitures are neither
punishment nor criminal, prosecutions for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Ursery ,
slip op, supra at 24-25. The State's judgment of forfeiture auain^ n

•' nt .*,-

his trafficking of cocaine does not violate the Fifth Amendment to the I Jiiited States

arguments, the State will not address any State Constitutional issues.
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CONCLUSION
The District Court's judgment of forfeiture violates neither the Fifth, nor the Eighth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The forfeiture judgment and order of the district
court should be affirmed.
DATED this 26th day of July, 1996.
E. NEAL GUNNARSON
Salt Lake County District Attorney

CRMS
Deputy District Attorney
Attorney for Appellee
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were delivered to Frank Parker, Claimant Pro Se, at 1388 Richard Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT 1
COMPLAINT OF FORFEITURE

DOUGLAS R. SHORT (#5344)
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY
BY:
MICHAEL E. POSTMA (#6313)
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State Street #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (801) 468-2 615

s, o ^ ^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
C O M P L A I N T
Plaintiff,
-vs94-13659 MURRAY CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT CASE NUMBER,
ONE LOT OF PROPERTY MORE
FULLY DESCRIBED IN THE
ATTACHED EXHIBIT A,

C i v i l No, 9 5 0 9 O cJy> ^—^
Judge

CV

SANDRA PEULER

Defendant.

COMES NOW the plaintiff and for cause of action alleges:
1.

That

the

defendant

is

94-13659

Murray

City

Police

Department Case Number, One Lot of Property More Fully Described in
the Attached Exhibit A.
2.
the

That Frank Parker is the individual in whose possession

defendant

property

was

located

in proximity

to

cocaine,

methamphetamine and amphetamines.
3.

That pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code §58-37-13

(1994) , said defendant property was seized on or about the 21st day

of November, 1994, at 4811 South State Street, Salt Lake County,
Utah by Officer Price of the Murray City Police Department incident
to an arrest.
4.

That on or about the 21st day of November, 1994, said

defendant currency was unlawfully found in proximity to forfeitable
controlled

substances,

paraphernalia

or

to

drug

manufacturing,

forfeitable

records

of

or

distributing

the

importation,

manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances, was intended
to

be

furnished

in

exchange

for

a controlled

substance,

was

proceeds traceable to such an exchange, or was used or intended to
be used to facilitate a violation of this act and is presumed
forfeitable pursuant to Utah Code §58-37-13,
5.

That on or about the 21st day of November, 1994, said

defendant vehicle was unlawfully used to transport or to facilitate
the transportation, sale, receipt, possession or concealment of a
controlled substance in and is forfeitable pursuant to Utah Code,
§58-37-13.
6.

That on or about the 21st day of November, 1994, the

defendant cellular telephone, pager and dayplanner were equipment
used or intended for use in manufacturing, compounding, processing,
delivering, importing or exporting a controlled substance, and is
forfeitable pursuant to Utah Code, §58-37-13 (1994).
7.

That

the

seizing

agency,

the

Murray

City

Police

Department is able to use the defendant property in the continued
enforcement of controlled substance laws, and that pursuant to Utah
Code §58-37-13

(1994) , plaintiff asks that the said property be

awarded to the Murray City Police Department.
8.

That pursuant to Utah Code §58-37-13

(1994), the Salt

Lake County Attorney's Office, as prosecuting agency, is entitled
to the legal costs incurred in filing and pursuing said forfeiture
action, to be paid by the seizing agency, the Murray City Police
Department.
9.

That pursuant to Utah Code §58-37-13 (1994), plaintiff

asks that all costs of this forfeiture proceeding, including filing
fees, be paid by Frank Parker, the individual whose conduct is the
basis of this forfeiture,
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment as follows:
1.

That

the

previously

described

defendant

property

be

ordered forfeited.
2.

That

the

seizing

agency,

the

Murray

City

Police

Department, is an appropriate agency able to use the defendant
property in enforcement of controlled substance laws and that said
property be awarded to said agency,
3.

That the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office be awarded

the sum of $25.00 as attorney fees for filing and pursuing this
action, to be paid by the seizing agency, the Murray City Police
Department.
4.

That

Frank

Parker

pay

all

costs

of this

proceeding, including filing fees.
DATED this 3 ) ^ ~ ~

day of March, 1995.
DOUGLAS R. SHORT
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY

MIjZfHAEL^. POSTMA
Deputy County Attorney

forfeiture

^STRICT COURT COVER SHEE^
I;

(a)

PLAINTIFFS,

THE STATE OF UTAH,

(b)

ATTORNEYS (name),
Bar #, Address,
Telephone #
MICHAEL E. POSTMA, #6313
231 East 400 South, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-4156
II.

NATURE OF SUIT (Place an x in appropriate category)
DOMESTIC

CIVIL

DA Divorce/Annulment

AA Administrative Agency

SM Separate Maintenance

AP Appeal

PA Paternity

h

CV Other Civil

SA Spouse Abuse

CN Contract

UR URESA Action

CS Custody & Support
HC Writ-Habeas Corpus

PROBATE
ES Estate

PD Property Damage

GC Guardian/Conservator

PI Personal Injury

NC Name Change

PR Property Rights (Real)

OT Other Probate

AJ Abstract of Judgment

MENTAL HEALTH
MH Mental Health

TL Tax Lien
JURY DEMAND
( )YES

MISCELLANEOUS
MI Miscellaneous

ABSTRACTS

HI.

ATTORNEY (if known)

( ) NO

ADOPTIONS
AD Adoption

EXHIBIT 2
CLAIMANT'S ANSWER

.,.._ FILED

®

FRANK PARKER
FOR HIMSELF
Department of Corrections
Draper, Utah
Z'.U

Li,,

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
A N S W E R

Plaintiff
-vs94-13659 MURRAY CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT CASE NUMBER,
ONE LOT OF PROPERTY MORE
FULLY DESCRIBED IN THE
ATTACHED EXHIBIT A,

CIVIL NO.
JUDGE:

95090280/

PEULER

Defendant.

COMES NOW FRANK PARKER and ANSWERS as follows:
I.
FRANK PARKER does not possess sufficient information to
admit or deny the allegations found in paragraph one of the
complaint. FRANK PARKER believes that the One Lot of Property
More Fully Described in the Attached Exhibit A is the
defendant in the forfeiture complaint.
II.
FRANK PARKER denies that the subject property was located
in such proximity to cocaine, methamphetamine e,nd amphetamines,
as to be the subject of a forfeiture action.
III.
FRANK PARKER does not possess sufficient information to

know whether ar

not the subject property was seized pursuant to

the provisions of Utah Code 5S-37-13.

FRANK PARKER admits that

on or about the 21st day of November, 1994, at 4811 South State
Street, the subject property was seized.
IV.
FRANK PARKER denies the allegations found in paragraph four.
V.
FRANK PARKER denies the allegations found in paragraph -five.
VI.
FRANK PARKER denies the allegations found in paragraph six.
VII.
FRANK PARKER denies the allegations found in paragraph
seven,
VIII.

FRANK PARKER does not possess suffieient information to
admit or deny the allegations found in paragraph eight.
IX.
FRANK PARKER denies the allegation found in paragraph nine.
WHEREFORE FRANK PARKER prays for the following judgment:
1.

That the One Lot of Property More Fully Described in

the Attached Exhibit A be returned to him, the owner

of said

property.
2.

That all costs and expenses of this forfeiture action

be bourne by the complaining party
3.

(ties).

Such other costs &nd awards that the Court may deem

equitable and just.

0 000 Iv

DATED THIS

/£

DAY OF _ _ ^ J < ^ _

, 1 99^

FRANK PARKER
VERIFICATION
FRANK PARKER, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes
and says that he is the T^^\LP/\PtfJ£ttLthe

above-entitled action;

that he has read the foregoing ANSWER and understands the
contents thereof, and the same is true of his own knowledge,
information and belief.

FRANK PARKER

-do
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this_/_<^_

.<JQ2A<L

»1995

day of

NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF UTAH
I* COM*** Earn

NOTARY PUBLIC,

Drapf.Uth MOM

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, FRANK PARKER certify that I mailed copies of this ANSWER
to Douglas R. Short and Michael E. Postma
Street #S3400, Salt Lake City, Utah
day of

L.JLL~bL!\'-l.

at 2001 South State

34190-1200

this _j_J

,1995

FRANK

0 <» 0 0 1 3

EXHIBIT 3
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

fiLEBDiSTRicrsa;:;,
Third Judicial Distric-

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
CLARK A. HARMS, 5713
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

OCT 1 7 1995

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

-vsCase No. 950902803 CV
94-13659 MURRAY CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT CASE NUMBER, ONE
LOT OF PROPERTY MORE FULLY
DESCRIBED IN THE ATTACHED
EXHIBIT A,

JUDGE SANDRA N. PEULER

Defendant.
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came on for trial on Wednesday, September 13,
1995, pursuant to the Notice of this Court. Judge Sandra N. Peuler, District Judge, presided.
Plaintiff State of Utah was represented by Clark A. Harms, Deputy District Attorney. Claimant
Frank Parker was present, pro se. The Court reviewed the file, and noted that Claimant filed a
Motion to Return Seized Evidence herein on or about August 16, 1995, which was opposed by
the State. Previous to the hearing, the Court reviewed the respective memoranda which had been
filed, and was in all respects familiar and conversant with the facts and issues of the case.
The Court called the matter for trial, and heard the testimony of the State's witnesses, and
the respective legal arguments of Plaintiff s counsel and of Mr. Parker. Mr. Parker did not testify
and presented no defense or other witnesses.

The Court noted that Mr. Parker raised and

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 950902803 CV
Page 2

presented no testimony in defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint, and yet Mr. Parker again stated
that he was finished presenting his case.

The Court, having heard and received the trial

testimony and evidence, having reviewed the file, being fully advised and informed in the
premises, for good cause shown, now makes and enters the following:
Findings of Fact
1.

Claimant Frank Parker's Motion to Return Seized Property was filed after the

Trial of this matter was scheduled, and raised factual issues which made such Motion untimely
and improper. Claimant's Motion should be denied.
2.

On November 21, 1994, Claimant was arrested, while on parole from the Utah

State Prison, after he responded to a page from John Blanchard wherein Mr. Blanchard informed
Claimant that he (Blanchard) wished to purchase cocaine from Claimant.
3.

On November 21, 1994 at approximately 11:50 p.m., Claimant was arrested at a

7-11 convenience store located at 4811 South State Street, where he had arrived in the Defendant
vehicle, to consumate a cocaine sale to Mr. Blanchard, and where he had arrived, driving the
Defendant vehicle while in possession of an open container of alcohol in the driver's
compartment of said vehicle, all of which were violations of law and of Claimant's parole.
4.

After securing Claimant and his vehicle, a search of the Defendant vehicle was

conducted, incident to Claimant's arrest, and pursuant to the terms and conditions of Claimant's
parole release from the Utah State Prison. At the time of Claimant's arrest, only he and his
passenger had been in the Defendant vehicle.
5.

In the Defendant vehicle, a black pouch was found, which contained several small

baggies, each of which contained a white, powdery substance. The State's witnesses testified,
and the Court finds, that this type of packaging is consistent with the sale and distribution of
cocaine.

(\ a a a -'• <•
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6.

Claimant's passenger, Kimberlee Croft testified, and the Court finds, that the

black pouch and baggies were the sole property and possessions of Claimant.
7.

At the time of Claimant's arrest, he was transporting, in his vehicle, several

baggies which contained a white, powdery substance. The substance was tested by the Utah
State Crime Lab, and found to be cocaine, with a total weight of 10.7 grams.
8.

At the time of Claimant's arrest, he was using and had used the Defendant vehicle

pager and cellular telephone to facilitate the transportation and distribution of controlled
substances, to wit: cocaine.
9.

At the time of Claimant's arrest, he was in the possession of the defendant

currency, which was located in the proximity of controlled substances, to wit: cocaine, and which
is therefore presumed to be the illegal proceeds of the distribution , purchase or sale of controlled
substances.
10.

Defendant currency was found in proximity to controlled substances, namely

cocaine. Claimant produced no evidence sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption that
the defendant currency is the proceeds of, or was intended to be used to facilitate, violations of
the Utah Controlled Substances Act.
11.

Claimant produced no testimony or witnesses to contradict the State's witness

evidence and testimony.
12.

Defendant currency is the proceeds of the illegal trafficking or distribution of

controlled substances.
13.

The seizing agency, Murray City Police Department, is able to use the defendant

currency, vehicle and property in its continued enforcement of controlled substance laws.
14.

Frank Parker is and was at all times the only registered owner and title holder in

and to said Defendant vehicle.
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FROM THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, THE COURT NOW MAKES AND
ENTERS THE FOLLOWING:
Conclusions of Law
1.

Claimant's Motion for Return of Seized Evidence should be denied.

2.

Claimant received all posible notice of these proceedings, and of his own volition

chose not to submit testimony or witnesses contradicting the State's evidence supporting
judgment in this matter.
3.

This Court has jurisdiction over the defendant currency, vehicle and property and

over the alleged interests therein of Claimant.
3.

Claimant Frank Parker is the individual in whose possession the defendant

currency, vehicle and property were located in proximity to cocaine.
4.

On November 21, 1994, the defendant currency was unlawfully found in

proximity to forfeitable controlled substances, was intended to be furnished in exchange for a
controlled substance and was proceeds traceable to an exchange for controlled substances, in
violation of the , Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-1 et sgg. (1995), and
is presumed forfeitable pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(l)(g)(ii) [1995]. No evidence
has been presented by Claimant or on his behalf which overcomes this presumption.
5.

On November 21, 1994, the defendant vehicle was unlawfully used to transport a

controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, in violation of the , Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-1 et seg. (1995), and is forfeitable pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-3713(l)(e)[1995].
6.

On November 21, 1994, the defendant cellular telephone and pager were

unlawfully used or intended for use in delivering a controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, in
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violation of the , Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-1 et seg. (1995), and
are forfeitable pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(l)(b) [1995].
7.

The seizing agency, Murray City Police Department, is able to use defendant

currency, vehicle and property in its continued enforcement of controlled substance laws.
8.

The Salt Lake County District Attorney's office is entitled to the legal costs and

fees incurred in filing and pursuing this action, to be paid by the Murray City Police Department
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (8)(a).
9.

Plaintiff State of Utah has met its burden of proof in this matter with respect to

each and all of the Defendant currency, vehicle and property, with the exception of the
Claimant's electronic dayplanner.
10.

Judgment against the Defendant One Lot of Property, with the exception of the

electronic dayplanner. and Claimant's purported interests therein, should be granted in favor of
the State. The electronic dayplanner should be returned to Claimant.
DATED this

[Q

day of

< Q C^H U L ^ .

1995.
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Certificate of Service

Clark A. Harms, Deputy District Attorney, by his signature below, certifies to the Court
that he delivered and served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law by depositing said copy in the United States mail, first class postage
prepaid, on October

, 1995, addressed as follows.

Mr. Frank Parker
Claimant Pro Se
UTAH STATE PRISON
P. O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

1

/
/<

;""

U

/CLAkK A.4mRMS
Deputy District Attorney

j \clark\parker fnd

EXHIBIT 4
JUDGMENT OF FORFEITURE

Third Judicial Distric?

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
CLARK A. HARMS, 5713
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

OCT 1 7 1995

E

T LAKE COUNTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT OF FORFEITURE
Plaintiff,
-vs-

94-13659 MURRAY CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT CASE NUMBER, ONE
LOT OF PROPERTY MORE FULLY
DESCRIBED IN THE ATTACHED
EXHIBIT A,

Case No. 950902803 CV
JUDGE SANDRA N. PEULER

Defendant.
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came on for trial on Wednesday, September 13,
1995, pursuant to the Notice of this Court. Judge Sandra N. Peuler. District Judge, presided.
Plaintiff State of Utah was represented by Clark A. Harms, Deputy District Attorney. Claimant
Frank Parker was present, pro se. The Court reviewed the file, and noted that Claimant filed a
Motion to Return Seized Evidence herein on or about August 16, 1995. which was opposed by
the State. Previous to the hearing, the Court reviewed the respective memoranda which had been
filed, and was in all respects familiar and conversant with the facts and issues of the case.
The Court called the matter for trial, and heard the testimony of the State's witnesses, and
the respective legal arguments of Plaintiff s counsel and of Mr. Parker. Mr. Parker did not testify

/: (. r.
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and presented no defense or other witnesses.

The Court noted that Mr. Parker raised and

presented no testimony in defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint, and yet Mr. Parker again stated
that he was finished presenting his case.

The Court, having heard and received the trial

testimony and evidence, having reviewed the file, being fully advised and informed in the
premises, for good cause shown, having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, now makes and enters the following Order and Judgment:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, THAT:
1.

Claimant Frank Parker's Motion to Return Seized Property is denied.

2.

Claimant Frank Parker is found to be without any legal interest in, or right or title

to the Defendant currency, vehicle and property, and each and all of the Defendant currency,
vehicle and property, to wit: ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN DOLLARS, UNITED STATES
CURRENCY; One 1986 HONDA, VIN JHMAF5328GS019454; One NOKIA CELLULAR
TELEPHONE, MODEL 100, SERIAL NO. 165/03533983; and One MOTOROLA DIGITAL
PAGER, SERIAL NO. 007POS1788699, are adjudged forfeited in accordance with the Utah
Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 et sefl. (1995); and that said Defendant
currency, vehicle and property shall be retained by the seizing agency, Murray City Police
Department, according to the provisions of said Act.
3.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(8)(a). (1995), the seizing agency, Murray

City Police Department shall pay a reasonable attorney's fee to, and reimburse all costs incurred
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by, the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office for its legal representation of the State of
Utah's, and the seizing agency's, interests in this matter.
4.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(9)(k) (1953, as amended), Judgment is

further entered against Frank Parker, whose conduct was the basis of this forfeiture, for all costs,
including any filing fees, and storage fees, incurred in connection with these proceedings.
DATED this \"\

day of

CV^Xo^v^
BY THE COURT:

, 1995.
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Certificate of Service

Clark A. Harms, Deputy District Attorney, by his signature below, certifies to the Court
that he delivered and served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and Judgment by
depositing said copy in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, on October D
1995, addressed as follows:

Mr. Frank Parker
Claimant Pro Se
UTAH STATE PRISON
P. O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

CHARMS
feputy District Attorney

j:\clark\parker.jdg

,

